Interpret and justify the existence of gaps

Abstract

On the theoretical and philosophical planes of Law, the issue of gaps has generated analyzes and controversies among jurists which, in turn, have given rise to the generation of new analyzes and new controversies. It is like a network that has been expanding with each opinion. Each thinker brings new criticisms, new perspectives, new answers and always –explicitly or implicitly– poses new problems and opens new questions. Perhaps due to lack of research on its origin or because it is simply by an anonymous author, we do not know who coined this metaphor called gaps in the law; but we suspect that it is lost in the times in which the codification movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the theoretical schools that developed and sustained this movement (school of exegesis and jurisprudence of concepts), began to be the center of various criticisms for the arrogance of believing that they had achieved the ideal of producing perfect legal systems2 and believing that they had condensed all possible law into codes. In any case, from a pragmatic perspective, the metaphor of the "gaps" is useful, because the apprentice in the knowledge of Law quickly understands that it deals with behaviors that are not foreseen as hypotheses in legal norms and that, therefore, , lack deontic qualification and normative consequence within the legal system.