Default in the paraguayan criminal process and its interpretation

Abstract

This research analyzes the regulations concerning default in the Paraguayan criminal process. Its objective is to determine whether the difficulty in its application stems from an error in interpretation or from the need for legislative reform. The exercise of criminal action is limited in time by the statutes of limitations and the rules for their suspension. These timeframes for limitation and suspension are established separately in the substantive law. Regarding the absence of the defendant, the applicable provision is Article 104 of the Penal Code, which considers default a ground for interrupting the statute of limitations for the exercise of criminal action. The research employed a qualitative approach with a non-experimental design. For this purpose, a documentary and hermeneutical study with a descriptive scope was conducted. It is concluded that the problem lies in the equivocal interpretation of the element–”objectively insurmountable circumstances” (Art. 103 of the Penal Code)–as this refers to the suspension of the statute of limitations. Consequently, the impossibility of interpreting these two provisions as having a dual effect is criticized. On the contrary, the dual effect of the defendant’s absence refers, on the one hand, to the interruption of the statute of limitations for the exercise of criminal action (Art. 104, No. 4 of the Penal Code) and, on the other hand, to the suspensive effect on the computation of the criminal process’s duration (Art. 136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).